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I.
T
HE Commission on Money and Credit
has laid its 285-page egg' and gone over
like a lead balloon —chooseyour own meta-
phor —withboth the economists and the gen-
eral public. Certain of its administrative sug-
gestions, notably those involving reconstitution
of the Federal Reserve System's Board of
Governors, have attracted a significant modi-
cum of attention.2 On the substantive side,
however, the Commission's main body of work
appears already spurlos verse,tht, in unhappy
contrast with both the National Monetary
Commission of fifty years past, whose influence
it was intended to rival, and the Radcliffe Re-
port of its closest contemporary trans-
atlantic equivalent.
This unhappy fate rather befits a series of
attempted least common denominators between
unreconciled and possibly unreconcilable spe-
cial interests, which turned out to be meaning-
less verbal compromises as often as anything
more. Indeed, the least uninteresting feature
of the report to this reader was the triangular
runningbattlebetweenthepredominantly
"sound finance," "don't rock the boat" posi-
tion of its text and the two accompanying sets
of mutually contradictory footnote dissents.
Set i, contributed primarily by the "labor bloc"
The Report of the Commission on Money and Credit,
Money and Credit, Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and
Growth (Englewood Cliffs,N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1961),is
referred to below as C.M.C. Report. (A summary pamphlet
was also published by the Commission.)
'The 2962 Economic Report 0/ the President devotes
approximately 2'/2pages(pp. 21—23) to the Commission's
report. The bulk of this space and the only positive recom-
mendations relate to "two reforms of clear merit ... which
are of direct concern to the President in •the exercise of his
responsibility to appoint the members and officers of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System" (p.
22). The first of these is a salary increase!
8Fora summary account of the National Monetary
Commission and its work, see Milton Friedman, "The Re-
port of the Commission on Money and Credit; An Essay
in PetitioPrincipii," American Economic Review, May,
2962, pp. 292—302. The official title of the Radcliffe Report
is: Committee on the Working of the Monetary System,
Report (Cmd. 827), London, H.M. Stationery Office,
(Lubin, Nathan, Ruttenberg, and Thorp,
with Ruttenberg the principal spokesman),
stands for guaranteed full employment and a
per cent annual growth rate, at any cost in
direct controls over everyone but organized
labor, and over everything but wages. Set 2,
contributed by a mixed bag of business, finance,
and agriculturalspokesmen (Black, Lazarus,
Miller,Schwulst,Shuman,Thomson, and
Yntema) stands for Free Enterprise in the
economic aggregates —McKinleyminus the
gold standard.5
Rather than aim a supernumerary nail at the
Commission's coffin, I propose to examine a
biased sample of the professional papers sub-
mitted for the Commission's use, and to all
appearances neglected by the Commission in
favor of cliches and weasel words masquerading
as common sense.° The papers are to an econo-
'The alliance of agriculture with business and finance,
rather than labor, calls for comment. The principal agri-
cultural spokesman (Mr. Shuman)isaffiliated with the
American Farm Bureau Federation, generally classed among
the more conservative farm organizations. An agricultural
spokesman affiliated with the rival Farmers' Union might
have sided more frequently with the other set of footnote
writers.
'Apropos of blocs and spokesmen, Friedman comments
("An Essay in Petitio Principii," p. 295): "...Ido not
believe any member of the Commission was deliberately
seeking to promote the special interest he represented. No
doubt each member would have leaned over backward to
avoid such action if the conflict between special and general
interest had been clear. What the warping of the recom-
mendations by the special interest character of the Com-
mission reflects is something very different and more subtle.
First, each of us knows and is acutely aware of his own
special problems; these are real and concrete; effects else-
where are hypothetical and vague.Second, thereisan
enormous temptation to identify our own interest with the
general interest, and the man who can avoid this temptation
is rare or non-existent. As teachers, we are surely in no
position to cast the first stone. How shall we interpret the
readiness of so many of us to proclaim that the national
interest requires higher salaries for teachers and more money
for schooling whatever its source ?" Pending further evidence
on the first two sentences, I accept this position.
'A noteworthy exception is the reference (C.M,C. Report,
p. 34) to the paper by J. W. Kendrick on "Concepts and
Measures of Economic Growth." More typical is a stand-
ard textbook statement that monetary policy is weak as a
stimulator of demand (ibid., p. 53 f.), when at least one
staff paper (Milton Friedman and David Meiselinan, "The
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mist more meaty and meaningful than the re-
port itself, and the question arises whether the
latter could substantially have been salvaged
by greater attention to them. To this question,
however, my summary answer must be a re-
gretful negative. The papers are too numer-
ous, too uneven, too long, sometimes too late,
and generally too technical for the busy and
part-timeCommission,even whenfiltered
through its small full-time professional eco-
nomic staff.
I cannot claim to have surveyed the entire
volume of unpublished staff papers, nor yet
every nth one of them. My "methodolgy" was
merely to select contributions from writers I
respect or on subjects I hoped might be related
to my own idiosyncratic views on monetary,
fiscal, and allied policies for full employment,
price stability, economic growth, and heaven
on earth quite generally.
II.
Let me devote this section to what I have just
called "my own idiosyncratic views on mone-
tary, fiscal, and allied policies," both to bring
these views to a wider professional audience
and to indicate the biases from which the pa-
pers themselves will unavoidably be viewed and
reviewed.
i. On the fiscal policy side, adopt the follow-
ing rule for changes in the real (deflated) gross
national product (GNP) as a target variable,
to be implemented by changes in the basic rate
of the federal personal income tax as an instru-
ment variable,7 and if necessary by changes in
exemption levels as well, all without regard to
Relative Stability of Monetary Velocity and the Investment
Multiplier in the United States, 7897—1958") says the pre-
cise opposite.
'Both the Administration (Economic Report ofthe
President,pp.i8ff.and 74—76)and the Commission
(C.M.C. Report, pp. 729 ff., 135) favor tai rate variability,
the former across the board and the latter much as sug-
gestedhere.Both variabilitysuggestions, however,are
completely discretionary and involve no rule of any sort.
Indeed, one lacuna in the C.M.C. Report is its failure to
face up to the issues raised by Simons in his "Rules versus
Authorities" paper of 7936 (Henry C. Simons, Economic
Policy for a Free Society [University of Chicago Press,
7948], Ch. 7). The Report's closest encounter with these
issues (pp. 131—133) is relevant only to inflexible rules—
an x per cent annual increase in instrument variable y, ruat
caelum —ratherthan totherulessuggestedeither by
Simons or the present reviewer.
budgetary balance but taking account of "au-
tonomous" fiscal changes:
(dY/V)1 = [(dN/N)+ (dir/ir)]t_i (')
HereV is of course deflated GNP, N the
labor force, and ir an index of man-week labor
productivity 8 in the private sector of the econ-
omy. This rule provides for income growth rate
adjustments to changes in the growth rates of
the labor force and of labor productivity. In-
terpreted to permit compensation in period
(t + i) for the inevitable errors in applying
the rule in period (t) and for underemploy-
ment in the beginning period (t0), it amounts
to a full-employment guarantee under condi-
tions of wage flexibility. The rule also requires
an adjustment period (lag) between (t —i)
and (t), which should be as short as possible,
so as to minimize oscillations of the hysteresis
type in the income growth rate; a three-month
lag is probably the practicable minimum at the
present time, suggesting corrections of (dN/N)
and (dir/i'-) for seasonal variations.9 Unlike a
few extreme suggestions in the C.M.C. Re-
port,'0 this rule involves no active attempts to
raise the rate of productivity increase at the
expense of current consumption.
2. On the monetary policy side, adopt the
following rule for changes in the money supply:
(dM/M)1=[(dN/N)+ (d.7r/ir)—
(2)
where the target variable M is the nominal
money supply (including time deposits)," V
The suggestion to use man-week rather than man-hour
productivity estimatesin(i)isdeliberate, althoughit
requiresrevisionofexistingproductivityseries.The
suggestion is intended to avoid bias in resulting
from the long-run decline in the working week, which is
expected to continue.
It may be desirable at some future date to substitute
over-all factor and productivity figures for the labor-force
and productivity figures suggested in (i), but these over-all
series are still in their infancy.(See Kendrick, "Concepts
and Measures," pp.21—23, for a defense of theiruse.)
Labor representatives generally oppose thissubstitution,
since it results in a considerable lowering of the rate of ap-
parent productivity increase.
As far as I am aware, official productivity series in the
United States are not yet corrected for seasonal variations.
"Op. cit., p. 31 (comment by Ruttenberg and Nathan),
p. 37 (comment by Sonne). "Theinclusion of time deposits follows Friedman's sug-
gestion in A Program for Monetary Stability (New York,
Fordham University Press, 1959, referred to below as Mone-
tary Stability), p. 88 f., although the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem does not yet publish seasonally adjusted monthly series
for the money supply inthis expanded definition.TheMONEY AND CREDIT RESEARCH PAPERS I 13
its corresponding velocity of circulation meas-
ured against the money GNP, and the other
variables and lags are as outlined in the last
paragraph.This rule provides monetary ad-
justments to changes in the growth rates of N,
andV. The rule should be enforced pri-
marily by purchases and sales, of government
securities of all with operations concen-
trated in issues with interest-elastic demand 12
in order to minimize interest-rate changes for
given monetary effects.Should open market
operations prove an inadequate instrument
variable, as for example after complete repay-
ment or monetization of the federal debt, they
may be supplemented by changes in primary
and secondary (public security)'3 bank-reserve
ratios which should be extended in any case
from commercial-bank members of the Federal
Reserve System totheir principal competi-
tors.14
C.M.C. Report follows the conventional restricted definition
excluding all time deposits (p. 46),
M. Okun's "Monetary Policy, Debt Manage-
ment, and Interest Rates: A Quantitative Appraisal" (in
the present series of C.M.C. Research Papers) assembles
the materials from which estimates of the interest-rate
elasticities of long-term, intermediate-term, and short-term
debt could be computed and compared, but concentrates
primarily on the problem of interest-rate determination,
Using r as the short-term rate and b as the long-term rate,
Okun estimates (S + 1) as 0.022 and as 0.41
in equation systems not involving potential full employ-
ment GNP. When this variable is added, the respective
coefficients become 0.022 and 0.034 respectively.(5, 1, and
L are the volumes of short-, intermediate-, and long-term
debt outstanding.) For the complete equations, from which
these coefficients have been taken, as well as others involv-
ing different monetary variables, see Okun, pp. 15—36, par-
ticularly Tables I—lI (pp. 27, 34).
13Althoughthere is much to be said for secondary-reserve
proposals,the Commission rejects them out-of-hand on
ideologicalgrounds, Nathan andRuttenbergdissenting
(C.M.C. Report, pp. 67 If., 101—102). As a useful concession
to hard-pressed state and local authorities, their securities,
as well as federal ones, should perhaps be legitimized for
inclusion in secondary reserves against deposits.Another
type of secondary reserve proposal involves special backing
for particular types of assets, such as commercial loans, as
per M. Bronfenbrenner, "A Loan Ratio for Inflation Con-
trol," Journalof PoliticalEconomy (Oct.,
14TheCommission (op. cit.,p. 70), in a surprisingly
bold moment, proposes that all commercial banks be re-
quired to join the Federal Reserve System as a condition for
insurance of their deposits by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.I should go further, along with Ruttenberg
(ibid., p. 170), to require federal insurance of deposits in
all savings banks and shares in all savings and loan asso-
ciations —withreserve requirements for membership in the
appropriate federal agencies.J. M. Henderson has pro-
posed yet further that all such reserve ratios be uniform
These two rules assign separate and com-
plementary roles to fiscal and monetary policy.
Taken together, they provide full employment
at stable price levels, in the absence of cost
inflation. They minimize conflict between the
partisans of fiscal and monetary policy, and
likewise between partisans of income-expendi-
ture and quantity-theory analysis. Relating the
instrument to the target variables in (i) and
(2)does,however, involve a modicum of short-
period forecasting; even one quarter in ad-
vance, this is taboo in some circles. It is, how-
ever, high time to forget about the failures of
the "new era" forecasters of the twenties and
the "prosperity just around the corner" fore-
casters of the thirties, and concentrate on the
relative success shown by the "Michigan" and
"Pennsylvania" methods in the later fifties and
early sixties'5
3. Should cost inflation in the real world be
the same bogey that it is along the Midway, or
should it be exorcised under our rules (i) and
(2),somuch the better. Under less sanguine
assumptions, nobody has devised any equally
simple rules to combat it. The most heroic at-
tempt to date is, so far as I know, Lerner's.'°
(in "Monetary Reserves and Credit Control," American
Economic Review, June, 1960, pp. 362—368). Compare also
Friedman's proposed compromise with the traditional Chi-
cago "Hundred-Percent Reserve" position(in Monetary
Stability, pp. 49 if., 88).
"These methods areessentially developments of the
Klein-Goldberger model of (L. R. Klein and A. S.
Goldberger, An Econometric Model of the United States,
1929—1952,Amsterdam,North-Holland, The"Michi-
gan" forecasts, on an annual basis, are developed by a staff
headed by Daniel B. Suits and presented at annual Con-
ferences on the Economic Outlook. The most recent one
is Suits, "The Outlook for 1962 as Forecast by an Econo-
metric Model of the U.S. Economy" (Ninth Annual Confer-
ence on the Economic Outlook, University of Michigan,
Nov., 1961), pp. 59—63, which does not reproduce the sta-
tistical framework found, e.g., in his similar forecast in the
Eighth Annual Conference (1960), pp. 53—60. The "Penn-
sylvania" forecasts have the advantage of being quarterly
rather than annual, but experience with them is just begin-
ning. See L. R. Klein's paper "A Postwar Quarterly Model:
Description and Applications," presented to the National
Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Research in
Income and Wealth, Feb., 1962.(The Social Science Re-
searchCouncilissponsoring alarger-scalecooperative
venture in econometric forecasting models, in which workers
in other institutions are joining with the Michigan and
Pennsylvania groups.)
A. P. Lerner,"Inflationary Depression and the Regu-
lation of Administered Prices," in The Rektionship of Prices
to Economic Stability and Growth (Compendium of Papers
Submitted by Panelists Appearing Before the Joint Eco-114 MONEY AND CREDIT RESEARCH PAPERS
It suffers from the ambiguity of his basic
"capacity" concept, from the possibility of forc-
ing prices to move in the opposite direction to
costs however defined, and from enforcement
difficultiesparticularly as against organized
labor. My own thinking on cost inflation has
become steadily more pusillanimous as hard-
boiled audiences have batted down successive
trial balloon "rules" one after the other.I
must limit myself to four suggestions, all with
discretionary elements.
a. That the antitrust laws be amended to
explicitly define price increases and price main-
tenance in recessions as evidence of antisocial
performance for purposes of antitrust suits, un-
lessjustified by the behavior of short-run
variable cost.
b. That either the President or the Tariff
Commission be empowered to suspend tariff or
quota protection from products whose admin-
istered prices rise, without justification in costs
not subject to collusive bargaining.
c. That "pitiless publicity" be given flagrant
sectoral cost inflationary behavior by segments
of either business, labor, or agriculture, either
singly or cooperatively.
d. Finally and most drastically, that public
authorities stand ready to provide and operate
"yardstick" capacity with unorganized labor,
a kind of "stand-by Socialism," should pressure
groups insist on cost-inflationary privileges as
their price for expanding capacity in line with
general economic growth.
Acomforting official line is that the un-
favorable American balance-of-payments posi-
tion, and its resultant periodic gold drain, will
right itself as soon as we put our domestic
nomic Committee),85thCongress,2dSess.,Mar. 31,
2958 (usually referred to as Price Compendium), p. 267
(abbreviated quotation):
"i. Permit an administered price increase only when
production and sales are at capacity.
"2. Enforce decreases in administered prices whenever
production and sales are significantly below capacity
as long as the price more than covers current operating
costs.
"3. Permit increases in administered wages in general
at a rate equal to the average trend of increase in national
productivity.
"4. Permit increases in administered wages greater than
this wherever the labor market is tight —with,say, less than
half the national average rate of unemployment.
"s.Permitonly smaller increases in administered wages
where the labor market is slack —with,say, more than
twice the national average rate of unemployment."
economy in order, without deflation, unemploy-
ment, or reduced international commitments.17
This may indeed prove true, but we should
consider also such possibilitiesas deflation
abroad, increased U.S. capital exports (to pene-
trate, for example, Customs-union tariff walls),
or increased U.S. public expenditures abroad,
both military and developmental.If one or
more of these changes occur on a major scale,
I should suggest letting the gold flow out, re-
ducing and eventually eliminating the required
gold backing from our money supply, and pre-
paring to embark, like Canada, on a system of
flexible exchange rates.
5.Itwill be necessary to explain to the pub-
lic the purposes and rationale of (i) to
above,in terms of providing stability and high
employment while preventing both demand or
cost inflation. This will be hard to do, because
the package is not so simply "sloganized" as
"guaranteed full employment," "doubling our
growth rate," "stable prices," "defense of the
dollar," "Free Enterprise," nor yet "national
economic planning(! )" are. The explanation
job should be done by someone in the upper
reaches of the Treasury, the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, or elsewhere in the government,
with enough prestige to speak authoritatively,
enough economic competence to talk economic
sense "on his feet," and enough public-relations
"savvy" to be convincing to audiences suspi-
cious of economic eggheads.This is both a
large order and a necessity, in view of the
probable pressure-group reaction to some of
these proposals and the possible "advertiser"
attempt to keep the case for (i), the group of
measures against cost inflation, from reaching
the public ear at all.
III.
Two of the most "fundamental" of this sample
of C.M.C. papers dealt with the trade-off, or
Phillips, problem. How much does price stability
cost in terms of unemployment or retardation,
or both, given some rate of increase in average
17Fora current example of official optimism, see Walter
W. Helter (Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers),
"Business Activity and Public Policy: What's Ahead for
'62 ?" an address before the Economic Club of Detroit
(Feb. 19, 1962, mimeographed), pp. 9—si.MONEY AND CREDIT RESEARCH PAPERS
productivity? Harris has put the issue succinct-
ly in his "Incidence of Inflation" study: 18 "We
would all acknowledge a 10-percent rise of
output and a I-percent inflation as splendid
public policy, just as we would all denounce a
policy that yields a 10-percent inflation and a
I-percent increase of output."
There are other trade-off problems between
and among price stability, high employment,
economic growth, and balanced international
accounts, but this one is by all odds the most
important. The "Phillips" problem, so-called
following Phillips'extraordinarily influential
1958 paper,19 can be stated: How much unem-
ployment (as a percentage of the labor force)
is required to keep money wages from rising
more rapidly than labor productivity, and thus
imparting to the economy an element of cost
inflation —alongwith whatever income re-
distribution may result? 20 The standard type
18SeymourE. Harris, "The Incidence of Inflation: Or
Who Gets Hurt?" Study Paper 7, Prepared in Connection
with the Study of Employment, Growth, and Price Levels
for Consideration by the Joint Economic Committee, U.S.
Congress (Nov. 26, 1959),p.3.(Papers in this series will
be referred to as J.E.C. Study Papers.)It is in fact rather
uncertain whether the late Henry Simons would have ap-
proved Harris' "splendid public policy" (as against an al-
ternative, providing no change in either price levels or out-
put), or whether the Scitovskys would "denounce" Harris'
opposite extreme (as against the same alternative).
"A. W. Phillips, "The Relation Between Unemployment
and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United
Kingdom, 1861—1957," Economica (Nov., 1958).For a
treatment of the subsequent literature through approximate-
ly the first half of 1961, see George L. Perry, "Aggregate
Wage Determination and the Problem of Inflation" (unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Aug., 1961), Chap. x.
The theoretical background of the Phillips analysis has
been set forth with particular clarity by Bent Hansen, "Full
Employment and Wage Stability" (in Theory of Wage De-
termination, John D. Dunlop, Ed., London, Macmillan,
'957), pp. 66—78.
'° evidenceon the distribution of national income in
the postwar inflation does not show any large-scale shift
among the major income categories. The wage and salary
share gained about 4.5 percentage points between 1947 and
1956; corporate profits did not change perceptibly; the
relative loss fell heavily upon unincorporated business along
with interest and rent receivers. "During World War II the
increase in farm proprietors' income... wasmore than
three times the employees' gain. The relative decline after
the war years may, therefore, reflect some catching-up on
the part of employees" (Alfred H. Conrad, "The Share of
Wages and Salaries in Manufacturing Incomes, 1947—56,"
J.E.C. Study Paper 9, p. 141).Cf. also G. L. Bach and
Alfred K. Ando, "The Redistributional Effects of Inflation,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, Feb., 1957, p. 4 if.; and
R. M. H. Hashimi, Studies in Functional Income Distribu-
of study like Phillips' is a time series for some
economy; some studies add additional var-
iables, such as corporate profits and the cost
of living, or recompute unemployment net of
unfilled vacancies, when the latter are reported.
W. G. Bowen, H. M. Levinson and Philip Ross
have also made cross-section analyses, using
U.S.data by industries and labor-market
areas,2' but the statistical fits have not been
encouragingconcerningtheunemployment
variable.
Relying considerably upon earlier work of
his own, Klein in his "Trade-Off" paper 22 sum-
marizes usefully a great deal of data on com-
parative growth rates,Phillipscurves, and
allied phenomena. I found useful his assembly
of Phillips curves (with an additional price-
level variable)for seven advanced countries
other than the United States and United King-
dom,21 his use of Goldberger's dynamization
of the Klein-Goldberger model to add a new
angle to the "stability-versus-growth" debate: 24
"Price increase and real output increase go
hand-in-hand...[but]no causality is im-
plied, for both variables are assumed to change
together as a result of common cause," and his
statistical evidence —nothowever extending to
a numerical trade-off ratio or marginal rate of
substitution —ofa negative relationship be-
tween international balance and the over-all
growth rate.25Insofar as full employment is
associated with high consumption while rapid
tion, Michigan State University, Bureau of Business and
Economic Research, Occasional Paper 3, 1960, pp. 30—43.
"Bowen, Wage Behavior in the Postwar Period. An
Empirical Analysis(Princeton UniversityPress,1960);
Levinson, "Postwar Movement of Prices and Wages in
Manufacturing Industries (J.E.C. Study Paper 21, Jan. 30,
1960, p. 22); Philip Ross, "Labor Market Behavior and the
Relationship Between Unemployment and Wages" (mimeo-
graphed, pp. 6—8, scheduled for publication in a forthcoming
issue of the Industrial and Labor Relations Review).
L. R. Klein (with the collaboration of M. Abe and R.
Bodkin), "Empirical Aspectsofthe Trade-Offs Among
Three Goals: High Level Employment, Price Stability, and
Economic Growth." The earlier work referred to is pri-
marily L. R. Klein and R. J. Ball, "Some Econometrics
ofthe DeterminationofAbsolute Wages and Prices,"
Economic Journal, Oct., 1959.
Klein, "Trade-Offs," p. 43if.(The seven countries
are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and
West Germany; the period covered is 1952—59.)
p. 64 if., citing Goldberger, Impact Multipliers
and Dynamic Properties of the Klein-Goldberger Model,
Amsterdam, North-Holland,
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growth requires high saving and investment,
there is a trade-off here too.
Klein comments critically upon the declining
American saving ratio and the rising American
capital-output ratio as combining to lower the
national growth rate.2° He also derives from his
Phillips-curve analysis an estimate of nearly 7
per cent of the labor force as the degree of un-
employment requiredfor pricestabilityin
America (as against perhaps 3 per cent in
Britain), fears that this figure, decidedly high-
er than most earlier estimates, may be rising
over time, and inveighs somewhat unfairly (in
my opinion) against "planned unemployment"
in the interests of price stability.27 These pas-
sages aside, Klein's contribution is a statistical
rather than a policy paper. The essay by Tibor
and Anne Scitovsky, on the other hand, is a
"public policy pamphlet" or "tract for the
times," disguised under the forbidding title of
welfare economics.28 Their conclusion invokes
little of the specialized apparatus of welfare
economics either old or new (to which Scitov-
sky has made outstanding contributions), and
is more inflationist than Sumner Slichter at his
most heretical.29Going beyond the Harris
judgment rule, they propose guaranteed full
employment at any cost —untilprices rise by
from 10 toper cent per year, at which point
they agree that the traditional textbook preach-
ments become relevant, mainly in the form of a
flight from money.3° Their point is based to
some extent on Phillips-type analysis; price
stabilization involves a great welfare loss in
°°Ibid., pp. 72if.
pp. 38 If,, 82.Theattack seems unfair since no
stabiizationist proposes to "engineer" unemployment, but
merely to live with it for the short run if it results from
bargained wage or administered price inflation.
3°Tibor and Anne Scitovsky, "Welfare Aspects of Eco-
nomic Growth, High Level Employment, and Price Sta-
bility."
'°Beforehis death in Slichter may have to some
extent retreated from his characteristic inflationism of 5—7
years before. In his posthumous Tulane lectures, Economic
Growth in the United States (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State
University Press,2961),Slichtertreatsinflationas"a
symbol of the excessive strength of the unions of manual
workers"(p.187), a relatively cheap price of a "free"
trade union movement, and a nuisance which may disappear
with the rising numbers of unorganized while-collar workers
relative to the organized blue-collar ones.
3°Untiltheonsetofhyperinflationpsychology,the
Scitovskys argue that "flight from money" is self-defeating
because it overvalues inflation hedges like common stocks
and real estate (op. cit., p. 25).
unnecessary unemployment and growth fore-
gone, but inflation (below their critical level)
involves relatively little welfare loss to rela-
tively few people.8'
Not only do the Scitovskys discount the costs
of inflation, but they also ascribe to it welfare
benefits of an essentially static nature, involv-
ing improved resource allocation.Given the
rigidity of money prices in a downward direc-
tion, they argue, citing Schultze's theory of
sectoral inflation, inflation is required to impart
downward flexibility to real prices and make
the market mechanism work.32Similarly, on
the aggregative side, long-run inflation increases
the effectiveness of monetary policy to check
depressions with the same effectiveness as it can
check booms, and lessens the danger of "push-
ing on a string."
My principal criticism of the Scitovsky argu-
ment is aimed at its sharp distinction between
plain inflation, which they support, and hyper-
inflation, which they oppose —andnever the
twain shall meet. We can all (or nearly all)
agree that inflation at the pace they consider
need result neither in an off-setting depression
like 192 0—192 i nor in hyperinflation on any
German, Hungarian, or Chinese model. We
should however consider more carefully than
they the cost involved in maintaining the dis-
tinction between the plain and hyperinflation
and holding down the inflation rate to their ac-
ceptable level in practice, in an economy of or-
ganized pressure groups, once pressure-group
leaders' and members' money illusionsare
eroded to the extent that further inflation be-
comes prominent in their standard expecta-
tional pattern.
Suppose, for example, that inflation at an ap-
proximate io per cent rate has proceeded for
On the costs of inflation, the Harris study ("Incidence
of Inflation," Chaps. 5—g) does not seem to have been
available to the Scitovskys.
32Scitovskys,pp. 37 if.The subsidiary reference is to
Charles L. Schultze, "Recent Inflation in the United States,"
J.C.S. Study Paper x(Sept., 2959), pp. 2—3.
Scitovskys, ibid., p. 23, citing William Vickrey, "Sta-
bility Through Inflation," in Post-Keynesian Economics, K.
K. Kurihara, Ed. (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press,
1954), Chap. 4.
Two important exceptions are the Economists' National
Committee on Monetary Policy and E. C. Harwood of the
American Institute for Economic Research. Compare the
Institute's review of the C.M.C. Report, "'Cooked' a Ia
Keynes," Economic News (September, 1961).MONEY AND CREDIT RESEARCH PAPERS
long enough for sellers' wage and price demands
to include adjustments for inflation anticipated
during the months and years until the next
round of negotiations. And suppose further
that the granting of these sellers' demands, and
their validation by easy money, credit, and
taxes, will carry us above the Scitovskys'
per cent inflation rate limit, even unaided by
any "flight from money." Then, if I interpret
them correctly, the Scitovskys would perforce
accept tight money and fiscal policies, designed
either to force modification of these demands or
to their invalidation by underemployment and
growth retardation.If this interpretation is
correct, all the Scitovskys really propose is to
cross that bridge when they come to it, to shift
the burden of inflation control to "futuregen-
erations," and gain a few years of general eco-
nomic whoopee at the expense of the slowest
escalating income groups in the economy.If
so, they are talking less about monetary or
fiscal policy in general than about a short-run
policy for the United States as of 1961—62, de-
signed less to increase the long-term employ-
ment and growth rates than to "make a record"
for the next couple of elections.
Be it short or long run, the advice to make
peace with inflation in the interest of fuller
employment, higher growth rates, or industrial
peace,35 runs counter to Section 2ofthe present
paper. The Phillips curve and its unemploy-
ment intercept have become an important el-
ement in such advice.36 Let me therefore offer
a conjecture that this curve may have quite
different parameters depending upon the an-
For a general and somewhat abstract theory of infla-
tion as a short-run social lubricant, see M. Bronfenbrenner,
"Some Neglected Aspects of Secular Inflation," in Post-
Keynesian Economics (p. 35 f.) and "The American Distri-
bution and Inflation Problems," Annals of the Hit otsubashi
Academy (April, 2959), pp. 186—191. A blunter and more
concrete example is given by John T. Dunlop, in "What
Price Stability?" The Reporter (May 28, 2959): "How high
a price in terms of more labor strife is the community willing
to pay for price stability?If managements are to secure
settlements below an average figure of four or five percent
a year, there will probably be more strikes about money at
contract-renewal time."
'° The Scitovskys estimate this interceptat 5—6 per cent
of unemployment, as against Klein's estimate of7 per cent;
their source is Paul A. Samuelson and Robert A. Solow,
"Analytical AspectsofAnti-Inflation Policy," American
Economic Review (May, 1960),p. 092.Like Klein, they
see this figure as rising over time.(Scitovskys, pp. i, 27,
20.)
ticipated pattern of public monetary and fiscal
reactions, and through these reactions upon the
strength of employer resistance to union wage
demands.37
Specifically, the "observed" or statistically




relatively high unemployment rate QU required
to hold the money-wage increase to the average
productivity-increase rate QA is, in my view,a
weighted average of curves P'P1, witha sub-
stantially lower critical unemployment rate
OU', and curve P2P2, with a substantially
higher critical unemployment rate 0U2. Curve
P'P' prevails under gold-standardor other
tight-money conditions, and curve P2P2pre-
vails when the monetary and fiscal authorities
are captive parties of the pressure groups.If
so, adoption of rules such as our (i) to
willshift PP to P'P'—althoughthe critical
rate OU' may still be too high to satisfy the
Scitovskys, the "labor minority" of the Com-
mission, the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the Conferenceon
Economic Progress, or the Lerner definition of
high full employment.38 By thesame token,
however, adoption of some rule involving mini-
understand this modification of the Phillips analysis
as a rephrasing of Morton's long-time attack on wage infla-
tion hypothesis (which antedates the Phillips curve), and
alsoas equivalent tothe frequent suggestions that the
Phillips analysis should be re-worked in real rather than
money terms. Compare Walter A. Morton, "Trade Union-
ism, Full Employment, and Inflation" (American Economic
Review, March, 0950) ; and more explicitly, "Keynesianism
and Inflation" (Journal 0/ Political Economy, June, x9sr).
For attacks on this position, see Lerner, "Inflationary De-
pression,"p.264,and H.S.Houthakker,"Protection
Against Inflation" (J.E.C. Study Paper 8, Nov. 26, 2959),
p. 125.
'8Lerner, Economics of Employment, New York, Mc-
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mal unemployment or a target growth rate at
any cost will shift PP to P2P2 and raise the
critical unemployment level above 0U2, quite
as feared by Klein and the Scitovskys.
Frequently accompanying the re-inforcing of
the Phillips-curve objections to monetary con-
trols, particularly, but not discussed adequate-
ly by the Commission or by the research papers
Isampled,is an essentially microeconomic
analysis, which I have diagrammed as Figure
2 and presented to classes as the "C.I.O." or
2
"MadisonAvenue"supplycurve.39Here
supply (curves S0, S1) is taken to mean average
explicit or accounting cost, plus a conventional
mark-up, in any of a number of industries. It
is presumed to be falling until capacity output
C is reached or approached. Under these cir-
cumstances:
i. Increases in wage rates and wage bills (in
several industries together, of course)raise
demand from D0 to D1, which permits the in-
crease in cost from S0 to S1 to be borne without
a price increase above the original level P0
unless the industry raises its profit margin.
TheA.F.L.-C.I.O. uses this argument, or rather its
verbal equivalent, to justify the position outlined in the
text.Compare, e.g.,the A.F.L.-C.I.O. statement to the
JointEconomic CommitteeHearings on Employment,
Growth, and Price Levels (86th Congress, ist sess., Nov. 23,
1959), pp. 3095if. ADA. and its economic affiliate, the
Conference on Economic Progress, have also expressed the
same view. "Madison Avenue" uses a parallel argument to
prove that advertising does not increase prices.I presume
that neither side would accept the validity of the argument
as used by the other.
2. Once higher wages have raised costs from
S0 to S1, a cutback in demand from D1 to D0 by
monetary and fiscal policy will raise rather than
lower price.Monetary policyisespecially
suspect, since it may add substantially to in-
terest costs.4° For monetary policy to be effec-
tive requires a depression sufficiently substan-
tial and protracted to lower wage rates and
profit margins.
Let us useto represent the elasticity of
demandfortherepresentativecommodity
whose market is illustrated in Figure may
be measured along either D0 or D1 in the neigh-
borhood of P0, ignoring differences between the
elasticities of the two curves. Let us use E to
represent the income elasticity of demand be-
tween Do and D1, and e to represent the elas-
ticity of supply along either S0 or S1, still in the
neighborhood of P0. What the expansionists
argue, in elasticity terms, is that dQ/Q0 in Fig-
ure 2e dP/P0, where dQ = — Qo)and
dP =(Pi—Po).4'The largerthe income-
elasticity of demand E, the greater the prob-
ability that this is true; and likewise, the larger
the income-elasticity of the wage bill (dY/Y)
± [d(NW)/(NW)], where N is employment
and W the wage rate. The income-elasticity of
the wage bill, in turn, depends on the wage-bill
elasticity of the wage rate [(N dW + W dN)/
NW] ÷ (dW/W), which reduces to A + r,
where A is the industry's elasticity of demand
for labor, a complex expression depending not
only on theelasticity of demand for the
product concerned, but also on the elasticity of
substitution between labor and other inputs
and on the elasticity of supply of these other
inputs.42The economic analysis underlying
Thisstress on interest cost is the particular contribu-
tion of Representative Wright Patman (D., Tex.). See his
Supplemental Views, appended to the Report of the Joint
Economic Committee on Employment, Growth, and Price
Levels (86th Congress, 2d sess., Jan. 26, 3960), p. 63.
As drawn, the diagram illustrates the equality case,
where dQ/Q0 =edP/P0 and price remains constant at Po.
Had D1 been drawn further to the right, dQ/Q0> e dP/P0
and increased wages would have lowered price below Po.
Had D, been drawn further to the left, dQ/Q, < e dP/P,
and increased wages would have raised price above Po, as
in conventional orthodox analysis.
J. R. Hicks, building on Marshall's Principles of Eco-
nomics, has derived the most general formula for L in his
Theory of Wages (London, Macmillan, 1932), Appendix
iii. The formula is:
o'(fl+e) +ke(n—o)
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Figure 2is therefore no simple matter, even
assuming "accounting cost plus conventional
markup" as equivalent to supply, a heresy
more popular outside than within the econ-
omists' professional ranks. My personal view
is that the basic condition dQ/QedP/P
represents more rationalism than realism for
most imperfectly competitive industries, but
there is authoritative opinion to the contrary
and I may just be wrong-headed. What we
have on this issue is a body of "liberal" and
"laboristic" thought assuming the realism of
the analysis of Figure 2, a body of conservative
and orthodox thought assuming the reverse
(except for the "Madison Avenue" variant)
and, to my limited knowledge, no mutual con-
frontation.
Iv.
We owe to Milton Friedman and his Chicago
colleagues our most widely known contempo-
rary proposals for fiscal and monetary reform
along the lines of rules as against authorities.
These proposals are also more inflexible than my
own suggestions of Section II above, and place
less reliance on short-term forecasting. On the
fiscal side, Friedman proposes a budget slightly
over-balanced at full employment.43 This re-
quires tax recomputations as public expendi-
ture policies change and as the economy grows,
but relies on built-in flexibility over the business
cycle with no rate changes. On the monetary
side, Friedman proposes a money supply, using
his expanded definition including time deposits,
which will grow byof i per cent per month
and 4 per cent per year, regardless of business
conditions.44Friedman is more willing than
whereis the elasticity of substitution, e the elasticity of
supply of substitute inputs (not of the product),the
elasticity of demand for the product (as in the text), and
k the proportion of the payroll to total cost. For further
discussion of this formula, comparison with certain simpli-
fications and development of implications, see M. Bronfen-
brenner, "Notes on the Elasticity of Derived Demand," Ox-
ford Economic Papers (Oct., 1961).
"Friedman, "A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for
Economic Stability," American Economic Review (June,
1948), reprinted in Readings in Monetary Policy, F. A.
Lutz and L. W. Mints, Eds. (Philadelphia, Blakiston, 2952),
selection and idem, Essays in Positive Economics (Chi-
cago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 133—156.
"Friedman, "The Supply of Money and Changes in
Prices and Output," in Price Compendium, pp. 241—256;
ide,n, Monetary Stability, Chap. 4.
most other writers, including myself, to write
off cost inflation as unimportant especially un-
der such a "religion of money."
Although the C.M.C. Report takes seriously
neither the Friedman proposal nor an alterna-
tive by E. S. Shaw which resembles it on the
monetary side,46 two of the most important
research papers do.Friedman himself, with
David Meiselman, marshals statistical evidence
that the parameters of the classical quantity
theory relating money to income and prices,
notably the velocity of circulation, are more
stable than the parameters of the Keynesian
theory relating autonomous expenditures to
income, notably the multiplier.47 A combined
M.I.T.-Minnesota task force criticizes, again
primarily statistically, Friedman's contention
that monetary policy acts on the economy with
a lag which is at once both too long and too
variable to permit reliance upon discretionary
action by the monetary authorities.48 (If Fried-
man is correct here, this also militates against
the usability of short-term forecasting in con-
'5As a sample of the evidence on which Friedman relies
for this position, see Martin J. Bailey, "Administered Prices
in the American Economy," Price Compendium, pp. 89—206;
Richard T. Selden, "Cost-Push versus Demand-Pull Infla-
tion, r955—57," Journal of Political Economy (Feb., '959),
and George J. Stigler, "Administered Prices and Oligopolis-
tic Inflation," Journal of Business (Jan., 1962).In the
present series of C.M.C. Research Papers, Jesse W. Mark-
ham's "Administered Prices and the Recent Inflation" (p.
34) leads to a similar result with the important exceptions
of the automobile and steel industries. Among the J.E.C.
Study Papers, compare Otto Eckstein and Gary Fromm,
"Steel and the Postwar Inflation" (Study Paper 2, Nov. 6,
2959) with Thomas A. Wilson, "Analysis of the Inflation in
Machinery Prices" (Study Paper 3, Nov. 6, (The
Eckstein-Fromm paper has invoked substantial Criticism
from labor circles in particular.)
E.S.Shaw, "Money Supply and Stable Economic
Growth," in United States Monetary Policy, Neal H. Ja-
coby, Ed. (New York, American Assembly, Columbia Uni-
versity, 2958), Chap.also Shaw, "Monetary Policy in a
Growing Economy," in Moses Abramovitz et al., The Allo-
cation of Economic Resources (Stanford University Press,
2959), pp. 218—235.
"Friedman and Meiselman, "The Relative Stability of
Monetary Velocity and the Investment Multiplier in the
United States, 2897—1958." The argument of this paper is
to some extent foreshadowed in Friedman and Gary S.
Becker,"AStatisticalIllusioninJudgingKeynesian
Models," Journal of Political Economy (Feb.,
48E.Cary Brown, Robert M. Solow, Albert Ando, and
John Kareken, "Lags in Fiscal and Monetary Policy," a
paper prepared for the CMC. Friedman has replied to this
criticism along with others in "The Lag in Effect of Mone-
tary Policy," Journal of Political Economy (Oct., 1961).120 MONEY AND CREDIT RESEARCH PAPERS
nection with my "lag" rules in Section II,
above.)
Let us consider first the Friedman-Meisel-
man paper. Their test is the prediction of con-
ventional consumer expenditures, not the more
controversial "consumption" of the Friedman
"permanent income hypothesis."They con-
clude that: 50 .forthe 62 years as a whole,
for all but one of the 12 overlapping periods
we have distinguished, and for both annual and
quarterly data after 1946, the stock of money
is more highly correlated with consumption
than is the level of autonomous expenditures."
(Autonomous expenditures are defined as net
private domestic investment plus the govern-
ment deficit on income and product account
plus the net foreign balance, while the money
stock again includes time deposits in commer-
cial banks.)
Having supervised some much cruder work
along similar lines —inspiredby discussion
with Friedman in 1958, but conducted inde-
pendently —Ican state quite unequivocally
that Friedman and Meiselman are right, in the
sense that their results do not depend on pe-
culiar statistical "gimmicks" in their models.
In my own variant, selected graduate students
fitted by ordinary least squares the following
elementary models, using American annual
data in real terms over the period 1946—60: 52
Keynesian Model:





Classical Model (Quantity Theory):
VY/M (M =Currencyplusde-
mand deposits)
V' =V0+ v n(n =Timein years)




V2 gave a better approximation to V (actual
GNP) than did V1, as measured either by a
smaller variance —V)2/nor by a larger
correlation coefficient Yyy., quite along the lines
of the Friedman-Meiselman study. This result
surprised my students, who came imbued with
Keynesian viewpoints and suspected tautolo-
gies lurking somewhere along the line.It also
surprised me and still surprises me, in view of
the success of Keynesian models in short-term
forecasting.53Itisnoteworthy thatthese
models of mine and likewise those of Fried-
man and Meiselman involve observations at
given points of time; they are static or consist-
ency models. The Klein-Goldberger model and
its descendants, on the other hand, include
equationsrelatingobservationsatdifferent
time periods; they are forecasting models in the
true sense.Can it be that, while classical
quantity theory models show superior consist-
ency, Keynesian ones show superior forecast-
ing power? If this is so, what does it mean? I
merely pose this quesetion; I cannot answer it.
Turning to the task force report on lags in
monetary and fiscal policy, we find the longest,
most ambitious, least conclusive, and least ef-
fectively organized papers of our sample.I
have not been able to master it in detail, and
it would require this entire paper to review it
point by point. I shall therefore confine myself
to its discussion of the "outside" lags between
monetary or fiscal actions and their effects on the
economy. About these outside lags more can
perhaps be said professionally by economists
than about the "inside" lags between changes
in the economic climate and shifts in policy;
also, in an economy of rules rather than au-
thorities, only the outside lags are important.
The task force estimates the outside lag in
5°SeeSection 2, footnote
C =C0+ c(Y —T)
T =T0+ t V
I, G, X =1o,G0, X0(Autonomous)
whence:
Co + Jo + Go + X0 —cTo
i—c (i—t)
(V1 ="Keynesian"estimate of Y)
"Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function
(Princeton for NBER, p. ii.
5°Friedmanand Meiselman, "Monetary Velocity," p. 31.
"ibid.,p. 26.
62Onegroup offive graduate students from overseas
carried out these tests at the Economic Institute, University
of Colorado (summer, 1961), under the direction of Pro-
fessor Irving Morrissett. Thomas Supel carried out the
same tests at the University of Minnesota (autumn, 1961).MONEY AND CREDIT RESEARCH PAPERS 121
monetary policy at no more than three months
between changes in the money supply
and changes in the F.R.B. index of industrial
production whether the lag be estimated
between turning points only or for entire sta-
tistical series.54 Between the entire series, over
a forty-year period and using Friedman's ex-
panded definition of the money supply, the
correlation coefficient between and
is .31 when the series are taken consecutively,
.25 when (SM) leads by one quarter, and .27
when (SQ) leads by one quarter. The average
lag in fiscal policy is somewhat longer, with ap-
proximately half the total effect on demand ob-
tainable within 6 months of the initial request
for tax legislation and no equally satisfactory
conclusions on the expenditure side.55More
precisely, "if taxes are reduced or increased in
a particular quarter and held at this new level
thereafter, consumer expenditures will respond
by 6o per cent of the change in the same quar-
ter, by 76 per cent in the second quarter, and
by 86 per cent in the third quarter," with an
element of further variability introduced de-
pending on the quarter in which the tax change
takes place. In general, insufficient work has
been done on the variability of all of these lags;
thereportadmitsasmuch, andstresses
throughout the tentative nature of most of its
conclusions.
On the monetary side, this is in deliberate
contradiction to Friedman's estimate of a long
and variable lag (16—22 months) between peaks
and troughs in (SM) and Q. The length and
variability of this lag are fundamental to Fried-
man's distrust of discretionary monetary policy,
and possibly likewise to such rules
admitting compromise as we suggested in Sec-
tion 2.Thetask force, while understressing
Friedman's argument from variability, attacks
his lag estimate as "a statistical artifact,"
primarily because the Q series includes effects
of (SM), which presumably delay its peaks
and troughs. The critics use a reductio ad ab-
surdum to put their complex methodological
issue unusually clearly:
Brown, et aL, pp. 33—38. (The correlations are taken
from pp. 36 if.)
p. 3.(The quotation is from pp. i6 if.)
Ibid., p. 4.
p. 27f.
Imagine an economy buffeted by all kinds of cycli-
cal forces, endogenous and exogenous. Suppose that
by heroic (and perhaps even cyclical) variation in the
money supply and itsrate of change, the Federal
Reserve manages deftly to counter all disturbing im-
pulses and to stabilize the level of economic activity
absolutely. Then an observer following the Friedman
method would see peaks and troughs in monetary
change accompanied by a steady level of aggregate
activity. He would presumably conclude that mone-
tary policy has no effects at all, which would be pre-
cisely the opposite of the truth.
This hypothetical example illustrates by an ex-
treme case an important truth. One cannot deduce
conclusions about the effects of monetary policy or
about their timing without making some hypothesis,
explicit or implicit, about what the course of events
would have been had the monetary authorities acted
differently.
To summarize in some haste: The task
force's case against Friedman's long lags seems
more convincing than its case for its own short
ones (with which case, as distinguished from
the task force's confidence in discretion, I in-
stinctively agree). The task force's case against
Friedman's variable lags, which are almost
equally important to his argument, is likewise
unconvincing. Much more work needs to be
done along this line on both the monetary and
the fiscal sides. On the monetary side, two
forthcoming National Bureau monographs by
Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz promise to
present much of the necessary basic data on the
American money supply over a period extend-
ing for nearly a century from the end of the
Civil War.58
V.
The Commission assigned a number of spe-
cialized quantitative and statistical subjects
for papers, elucidating special aspects of mone-
tary economics, fiscal economics, and economic
growth. The present sample includes several of
these. Some, such as the papers by Kendrick,
Klein, and Okun, have already been consid-
ered.
I have been unable to obtain one study (by
Eisner and Strotz, on investment functions) in
time for inclusion here. This section is there-
fore limited to consideration of two papers,
0. H. Brownlee and Alfred Conrad, "Effects
Fordetails, see Friedman, "The Lag in Effect of Mone-
tary Policy," p. 447, footnote 2.122 MONEY AND CREDIT RESEARCH PAPERS
Upon the Distribution of Income of a Tight
Money Policy";and G. L. Bach and C. J.
Huizenga, "The Differential Effects of Tight
Money"
The charge of inequitable (meaning dis-
equalizing) income effects is often made against
tight money because of its effect on interest
rates.(It is also made against inflation as
well.)The Brownlee-Conrad paper subjects
this charge to detailed statistical scrutiny under
conditions as of the United States in
Brownleeand Conrad first estimate the size of
the interest-rate increase which would under
those conditions have been required to reduce
the money supply sufficiently to prevent a
per cent price increase. (This turns out to be
1.7percent.) They then estimate the size of
the federal tax increase which, under the same
conditions, would have been required to reduce
money GNP sufficiently to prevent the same
which I have summarized in Table i.61 From
the viewpoint of equality in the personal in-
come distribution,theseresults areclearly
favorable to tight money and unfavorable to
inflation, to an extent greater than is likely to
be offset by any later estimates based on rea-
sonable alternative assumptions. Being based
on totals and averages, however, such results
are to some extent irrelevant, insofar as the
incidence of tight money may depend primarily
on debtor-creditor status and only secondarily
on personal income, or the incidence of inflation
may depend primarily on the income distribu-
tion by ages rather than by income brackets.
Another charge against restrictive monetary
policy involves unfairness as between large and
small business. The Board of Governors sur-
veyed business loans on a sample basis in 1958,
withresults summarized by that inveterate foe
of tight money, Congressman Patman: 62
TABLE 1.—PER





(net worth, 5957 price)
Assumption I' Assumption SIb
(net interest receipts)
and Taxes' Tax Increase
(disposable tncome)
$I99gorunder —96 —86 70 6s —29 —50
2000—2999 —77 —66 52 41 —6o —46
3000—3999 —6i —43 35 iS —90 —74
4000—4999 —64 —41 37 15 —iió —io6
5000—5999 —53 —24 25 —3 —151 —153
6000—7499 —9 23 —14 —45 —211
7500—9999 '9 58 —45 —82 —265 —286
10,000—14,999 74 g8 —io8 —131 —409 —449
15,000—19,999 98 66 —150 —119 —730 —821
2o,000andover 667 540 —795 —705 - —3487 —3367
'Two-thirds of federal corporate income tax allocated proportionately to dividend receipts, one-third proportionately to consumer expendi.
tures.
bTwo-thirdsof federal corporate income tax allocated proportionatelytoconsumer expenditures,One-third proportionatelyto dividend
receipts.
SOTJRCE: Brownlee and Conrad, Tables 2,3,4, pp. 79, Si, 83.
price increase.(This turns out to be bil-
lion.) Then the effects of the price increase,
the interest-rate increase, and the tax increase
were compared, by income classes, with results
60Page references will be made to a preliminary version,
American Economic Review (May, 5960),whichhowever
omits much of the detail of statistical derivation.
to PublishedinAmericanEconomic Review(Mar.,
1961). See also Duane Carson, "The Differential Effects of
TightMoney:Comment," and BachandHuizenga's
ibid. (Dec., 1961).
The Federal Reserve was finally prevailed upon to
make a survey to see what happened to bank loans
to business firms as between October 5955 (an easy
credit period) and October 1957 (a very tight credit
In preparing this table, I have adjusted the Brownlee-
Conrad "interest rate" figures to refer to the comparable
5.7 per cent rate increase rather than the standard i.o per
cent figure which they present.
Report of Joint Economic Committee, Employment,
Growth, and Price Levels (Jan. 26,iç6o), p.64, footnote
86-a.
CAPITA GAINS AND LOSSES, BY INCOME CLASSES, PROM ALTERNATIVE MONETARY-FISCAL PoLIcIEs,
1957BASE
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period). Small firms with less than $50,000 of assets
bad 3 percent less bank credit in the latter period,
and the corporate giants with more than $ioo million
of assets, had 66 per cent more bank credit. And in
between these extremes, the various sizes of firms
fared disproportionately according to their size.
This indictment implies that the difference
is explained entirely from the supply side, by
discriminatoryshiftsincommercialbank
supply of credit as between large and small
firms. Bach and Huizenga, however, use the
same data to develop the opposite case. They
believe the difference is explained primarily
from the demand side, by differential shifts in
the demand for bank credit by large and small
firms. Their method involves a division of the
universe of reporting banks into three classes
of tightness or looseness (in 1957), and a dem-
onstration that the loose banks behaved much
like the tighter ones during the two-year period
under study. While the data are not complete-
ly unequivocal and formal tests of significance
are not employed, Bach and Huizenga conclude
that: 63 "although tight money in 1955—57 may
have led to little 'unfair' discrimination against
particular borrower groups, it did permit funds
to go extensively to the same borrowers who
would have obtained them in the absence of
tight money. Whether the marginal borrowers
shut out by tight money would have contributed
significantly to either undesirable investment
or inflation cannot be told from these data.
Probably at least as much (more, on the ob-
jective evidence) of the marginal credit shut
off was to large as to small firms."
It is conceivable, although I suspect unlikely,
that the Bach-Huizenga results might have been
different from some reasonable alternative defi-
nitions of "business loans" or classifications of
individual banks as "tight" or "loose." Some-
what more important, to my way of thinking, is
the difficulty of distinguishing between those
small firms that are truly independent and
those that are only captive suppliers or sales
outlets for larger ones.°4It is possible that
tight money may lead to credit discrimination
against the former class, without the discrim-
"Bach and Huizenga, "Reply," p. 79.
04jhavemade this point earlier in a Japanese setting,
where it is probably more important than in America. M.
Bronfenbrenner, "Monopoly and Inflation in Contemporary
Japan," Osaka Economic Papers (Mar., 1955), pp. 43 ff.
ination being reflected in the Bach-Huizenga
statistics.In the same way, as Bach and
Huizenga themselves point out,65 "it was im-
possible to test the hypothesis that tight money
leads banks to discriminate against new busi-
ness."
VL
A final class of C.M.C. reports is the textbook
chapters, which one might expect to be adapted
better to the needs of the Commission members
themselves than to those of their permanent
staff or to the tastes of carping professional
critics. The present sample contains three text-
book chapters, James Tobin's "An Essay on
the Principles of Debt Management,"Lester
V. Chandler's "Potentialities and Limitations
of Monetary Policy," and Charles P. Kindle-
berger's "Flexible Exchange Rates."
Of the three chapters, Tobin on debt manage-
ment is at once the most advanced, the most
original, and the most paradoxical.°7(These
very qualities may have detracted from the use-
fulness of the paper to the Commission.) Three
main features of the 120-page contribution
stand out in this reader's mind: (i) the treat-
ment of the public debt's effect on private in-
vestment in equities; (2) the presentation of
the case for interest rate minimization; 68 and
theargument in favor of price index or pur-
chasing-power securities as one means of lower-
ing interest charges. Tobin does not consider
theSimons case for a sharp division of the
debt into money (at one extreme of liquidity)
and consols (at the other) •69 J propose to com-
ment here on points (i), and(a).
""Reply,"p. 79, footnote 28.
"An unfortunate duplication is Thomas Mayer's "In-
terest Minimization as a •Criterion of Federal Debt Man-
agement Policy," which, although not a textbook chapter,
loses much of its impact by overlapping with section 3 of
the Tobin paper.
"Federal debt instruments serve so many purposes in
the contemporary monetary and financial system that ob-
servers sometimes wonder what the system would do if
the debt were eliminated by a miraculous series of budget
surpluses. What would we do for a currency supply, for
bank reserves, for the money market, for secondary reserves
of all kinds?" Tobin, p. 45.
"Tobin, "Principles of Debt Management," section 3;
with this section compare Mayer, Chaps. x, 6.
"Mayer, however, considers the Simons proposal
(pp.
6
if.); the C.M.C. Report does not. For the proposal itself,
see Simons, Economic Policy, Chaps. 9 if.124 MONEY AND CREDIT RESEARCH PAPERS
i. If an increase in real public expenditures,
leading to an increase in the real national in-
come, is financed by an increase in the public
debt, Tobin's analysis (section 2.1—5) of the
effects of these transactions on the markets
for public debt securities (repayable in money)
and private equity securities (representing real
capital) can be presented diagrammatically in
oversimplified form in Figure 3. The volume
a
3-b. These shifts will reduce the size of the rate
and price differentials, while increasing private
investment still further. The encouragement of
private investment by increased public debt will
be weaker for long-term debt than for short-
term debt, and strongest of all for what Tobin
calls "demand debt" or monetized debt, but
Tobin is quite certain that his paradox will hold
even for completely long-term debt in mone-
FIGURE 3
b
of securities demanded and supplied is plotted
in each case along the horizontal axis, and the
security price along the vertical one. There is
in each case an increase in demand from D0 to
D1, because of the increase in the national in-
come. In Figure 3-a (public debt securities),
there is likewise an increase in supply from S0
to S1. The effect on price is indeterminate, and
in the diagram we have held the price constant
at OP, while the volume of sales rises from
to In Figure 3-b (private equity securi-
ties), the supply function is unchanged at S,
and the price rises from OP0 to OP1. This rise
in price involves a fall in the private interest
rate on real capital relative to the public inter-
est rate on money capital, and thus encourages
private real investment. This encouragement
is reinforced because public and private securi-
ties are substitutes on the demand side. The
interest-rate differential will lead to further
shifts of the demand curves D1 in Figure 3, to
the left in Figureand to the right in Figure
tary form. It may not hold, however, when the
debt is in "real", or purchasing-power, form.
This is one reason for Tobin's advocacy of
purchasing-power or index bonds, to permit of
debt expansion in an inflationary situation
while minimizing the shift to private invest-
ment.
There has arisen concern recently, following
publication of James M. Buchanan's Public
Principles of the Public Debt,7° about an offset
which may more than overbalance Tobin's en-
couraging paradox as to the effect of public
debt on private investment.Oversimplifying
drastically once more, the argument is that a
rising public debt increases the proportion of
"assets" (securities of all kinds, both money
and "real") to consumption goods. The result
will be an all-round fall in the price of assets
Homewood, Ill., Irwin, 1958. For subsequent bibliog-
raphy, and alsorestatement and extension,seeFranco
Modigliani, "Long-Run Implications of Alternative Fiscal









0 00Suppose a simultaneous rise in income and
the public debt, moving the optimum point on
Figure 4 from P0 (on indifference curve to
P1 (on indifference curve Ii). In order that P1
be an equilibrium point consistent with the
community's preferences between present and
future (as indicated by the indifference map),
the price line through P1 must be steeper than
that through P0. This implies a higher interest-
rate level all round, and therefore some dis-
couragementofprivate While
Tobin does not seem to have taken this pos-
sibility into account, we do not yet know its
quantitative significance.
Tobin'sadvocacy of purchasing-power,
index, or escalating public securitiesis not
claimed to be original with him.7' He gives it
more serious consideration, however, than do
most other writers, devoting to it the entire
71FranklynD. Holzman, "Escalation and Its Use to
Mitigate the Inequities of Inflation," a paper in the present
series which reached me too late to receive the attention
it deserves, collects (pp. x6, i8) a number of examples of
and proposals for index bonds.The oldestones,inci-
dentally, date from Colonial America and implicate the
Founding Fathers of the i8th century.
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fourth section of his paper. The proposal is too
radical for more than an off-hand rejection in
the C.M.C. Report,72 but it is taken seriously
before rejection in the Report's British con-
temporary:
Once it was put into practice, however, it seems
certain that the plan would spread to other interest
payments, and it would not be easy to restrain exten-
sion to a wide range of other payments hitherto
fixed in money. Such an extension would very soon
constitute a major alteration in the working of our
economic system, and inevitably tend to accelerate
inflation. A Treasury driven into a tight corner in
its debt management might do worse, but we hope
that the Government of the United Kingdom will not
be driven to resort to an expedient which would too
plainly be a confession of failure to maintain a reason-
able degree of stability in the value of money and
might easily have disruptive consequences for our
economic system.
Tobin's reply insection4.315effective
against the "confession of failure" argument,
but relapses into wishful thinking as against
the "acceleration of inflation" argument:
No government, whatever may be its intentions
and financial scruples, is able to guarantee the con-
stancy of the price level even for its own tenure of
office, much less for all time. No government has
ever been able to do so, and none ever will be.It is
just beyond the power of government in a free and
decentralized economy with a democratic political
order. It is sufficient to recall that war and its after-
math are the main generators of changes in the
price level. No one, alas, can guarantee perpetual
peace...Evidentlyfor many people the clinching
argument against purchasing power bonds would be
a signal that the government had given up its battle
to control the price level.Similarly unemployment
insurance might be interpreted as a signal that the
government had given up the battle to prevent un-
employment. Civil defense might be regarded as an
indication that the government no longer believed it
possible to keep the peace or to defend the country
from hydrogen bombing. To take •precautions to
"Op. cit., p. 107.
"Radcliffe Report, para. p. 212.
Tobin, "Principles of Debt Management," pp. 99, io8,
105—107. Compare also Holzman, "Escalation," pp. 41if.,
56—58.Holzman alsoproposes extending theescalation
principle to savings deposits, public salaries, insurance pol-
icies, pensions, and other types of "fixed" assets and in-
comes.His treatment of the "accelerationof inflation"
argument is concentrated in the pages dealing with wage
escalation (pp. 33—41). On the theoretical side, Holzman's
treatmentisno more conclusive than Tobin's, but he
marshals a certain amount of inductive evidence which
suggests that such acceleration has been negligible in recent
American experience (pp. 38 if.).
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(riseininterest rates).This isillustrated
diagrammatically by Figure 4, which repre-
sents a community indifference map involving
present consumption goods (horizontal axis)
and the future income from securities (vertical
axis). The slope of a price line in the diagram
= (i + r),whereristhe interest rate. A steep-
er slope implies a higher rate of interest, and a
lower price for a dollar of future income.
Ficuaz 4
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protect people from unfortunate events does not
mean that the government regards the events as in-
evitable, or even that the government intends to
slacken its own efforts to prevent them. The public
can understand that.
The purpose of purchasing power bonds...is
precisely to avoid the redistributions of wealth and
income that are the principal objections to inflation.
If this purpose is attained, inflation is no longer such
a danger.It is circular, therefore, to object to pur-
chasing power bonds on the grounds that they are
inflationary.
Nevertheless, it is far from clear that a regime with
purchasing power bonds would actually be more
susceptibletoinflation than the present financial
regime.In the first place, purchasing power bonds
would strengthen the controls over the economy
possessed by the monetary and debt management
authorities.In the second place, the availability of
a more satisfactory menu of assets might well increase
non-inflationary saving, encouraging the saving appe-
tites of individuals and households of modest in-
comes... Thepolitical argument is more difficult
to assess. The allegation is that escalation will vitiate
the strength of political forces opposed to inflation.
Presumably these now consist of people who stand to
lose from inflation...Theadvent of purchasing
power bonds will not mean that no one stands to
lose from inflation.As at present, it willstill be
possible to bet that the accumulation of interest on
fixed-money-value assets will outrun the price level.
Those who take 'that side of the bet will favor anti-
inflationary governmental policies. But in any case
economists are probably inclined to exaggerate the
degree to which positions on government economic
policy reflect calculated self-interest with respect to
inflation or deflation. To a large degree they seem to
reflect ideological or moral attitudes, primitive eco-
nomic reasoning, and entrenched political positions.
These and other arguments of Tobin's would
I think be more convincing if the introduction
of index bonds were coupled with some sort of
major monetary and fiscal reform to reduce the
economy's susceptibility to inflationary pres-
sure.Substitution of rules for discretionary
authorities, as by either the Friedman and Shaw
proposals or the suggestions in Section II above,
would help in this connection.
4. We may vouchsafe the hypothesis that
the Simons debt-policy proposals have been
largely forgotten and laid aside because their
emphasis on consols maximizes interest rates
rather than minimizing them,75 especially in a
period of inflation. The appeal of the proposal
"Subject to...obviousreservations, the Treasury
should seek always to pay as much interest as possible."
Simons, Economic Policy, p. 225.
comes from its elimination of any danger of
debt monetization as a counter pressure to dis-
cretionary action by monetary authorities with
weak powers and limited mandates for action.
With the authorities given both greater power
(as, for example, over the reserve ratios of both
commercial banks and financial intermediaries)
and a clear mandate to regulate the growth rate
of the money supply, the Sinions proposals
lose their point.
The Chandler chapter is a thoroughly com-
petent, reasonably complete, but generally un-
exciting presentation of a position which comes
as close as any other to being current American
monetary orthodoxy. Less venturesome than
some of the Chandler proposals of the later
1940'S, his paper ends up fairly close to the
relevant portions of the C.M.C. Report itself.
I was struck, for example, by the bland assur-
ance that, during an inflationary boom, "there
is a broad middle ground between a monetary
policy so weakly restrictive as to be ineffective
and one so excessively restrictive as to precipi-
tate panic and depression"; " considering the
number who disagree, a certain amount of evi-
dence would have been desirable. In bringing
about an upturn from a recession, however,
Chandler would have monetary policy play
second fiddle to fiscal policy, despite his belief
that its lags are shorter.77 He favors monetary
discretion as against monetary rules," accepts
the notion of a velocity ceiling (except in hyper..
inflation),79 and gives mild approval to pro-
posals for greater authority by the Federal
Reserve System over financial intermediaries.80
The argument is almost entirely nonquantita-
tive, even when considerable quantitative ma-
terial is available regarding the functions and
effects with which Chandler is dealing.
Kindleberger's treatment of exchange rate
flexibility likewise falls short of "vintage Kin-
dleberger," although it includes an excellent
review of the literature and furnishes the first
draft for a future contribution. Kindleberger
makes much of the fact that flexible rates vary
more than fixed ones, which should occasion
'°LesterV. Chandler, "Potentialities and Limitations of
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little surprise. He goes on to worry about the
possible instability of foreign exchange mar-
kets, without explaining why such instability is
more likely there than in other free commodity
and security markets.Actually, some short-
run instability is not fantastically uncommon in
other markets, which have developed a variety
of institutional arrangements for mitigating it
—temporaryshutdowns,"specialists"who
"make markets," limitations on daily price
movements, and so on. Why, one wonders, are
similar arrangements impossible on foreign ex-
changes withflexiblerates?Furthermore,
abandonment of fixed rates need not imply
complete absence of government and central
bank transactions, any more than abandon-
ment of "pegging" government securities re-
quired the Federal Reserve System to abandon
open-market operations. Once again, is there
no intermediate zone between pegged rates and
"disorderly markets?"
In fact, we have had for a number of years
international exchanges with flexible rates (in-
cluding flexible gold prices) in such places as
Tangier and Hong Kong, with specialized prob-
lems of cross rates, multiple currencies, ar-
bitrages, forward exchanges (?),and what not.
It might prove useful for enthusiasts on both
sides of the flexible exchange question to ob-
serve these markets, and the peculiar institu-
tions developing in them. They could see for
themselves which are the real difficulties and
which the bogeys, in addition to theorizing in
vacuo as Kindleberger does (atypically for
him) in the greater part of this essay.
VII.
The predominant intellectual atmosphere of
our monetary and fiscal institutions is an uneasy
reconciliation with the status quo.This is
slightly better than "quiet desperation," but
only slightly. Everyone agrees, as an academic
matter, that our performance could be im-
proved regarding employment, price stability,
81Kindleberger("Flexible Exchange Rates")is aware
of thepossibilitiesof these intermediate-zone Operations
but concerned with possible chaos should governments bid
against each other."If any but an occasional interven-
tion occurred, it would be necessary to evolve an inter-
national management of exchange rates" (p. 23),particularly
if no rate were tied to an international standard such as
gold.
and growth —allthree. But at least the pres-
ent is preferable to the recent past. On oc-
casion, the egghead, crackpot, or ineffectual
will risk rocking the boat with major changes,
which might return us to the thirties or the war-
time économie dirigée, accelerate the pace of
inflation, or disturb the tenuous stability of
equilibrium between agricultural, business, and
labor pressure groups.This atmosphere of
reluctant reconciliation and foot-dragging con-
formity dominates the C.M.C. Report, and
likewise a minority of the C.M.C. research
papers sampled here.If it does not dominate
the majority of the papers or their present re-
viewer, so much the worse for the papers and
the reviewer.
What sort of circumstances, if any, are likely
to disturb the apologetic smugness of practical
men regarding our monetary and fiscal arrange-
ments, and permit reform proposals to be con-
sidered with biases in their favor rather than
the reverse? I can envisage three such circum-
stances, and shall close their over-long sample
study by considering them separately, although
they may of course befall us in combination.
i. Our periodic recessions and abortive re-
coveries may produce something like "creeping
stagnation," 82 or we may undergo one or more
serious depressions. This sort of development
seems most likely in the event of any sharp
reductionindefense expenditures, such as
might result from a disarmament agreement or
the outbreak of a genuine peace. I do not wish
to be interpreted as implying that disarmament
must inevitably mean depression under capi-
talism; even the Party Line seems to be waver-
ing on that point, in the Soviet Union if not in
this country. I mean only that peace and dis-
armament, if they come, may conceivably mean
blundering into stagnation or depression while
we argue in semiparalyzed fashion, what taxes
(if any) we should cut, what welfare expendi-
tures (if any) we should increase, and how fast
(if at all) we should reduce the national debt.
2.Thepace of inflation may accelerate be-
yond the ic—ispercent annual rate that the
Scitovskys suggest as the upper limit of toler-
ance, not to mention the lower estimates of
"I believe this phrase was first used, either prophetically
or prematurely, as the case may be, in Monthly Review
(June, as the title of a leading editorial.128 MONEYAND CREDIT RESEARCH PAPERS
other writers.83 This is most likely to occur
under conditions of increased military activity
at a sustained level, even considerably short of
all-out war. As this is written (March, 1962),
Indo-China and Latin America seem to be the
principal danger spots in this connection, but
tomorrow'sheadlinesfromGermany,the
Middle East, Korea, or any of a number of
African areas can change or add to these. Even
without a military pretext, however, inflation
can be accelerated by greater monetary and
fiscal ease in/the quest for fuller employment
and-or faster growth, or as the price for indus-
trial peace at collective-bargaining time.
3. Price stability, actual and not "reason-
able," may enter the cold war and competitive
coexistence, much as full employment entered
in the forties and growth rates entered in the
fifties. Thanks at least partially to direct con-
trols, several of the Iron Curtain countries,
including the Soviet Union, have combined full
employment and rapid growth rates of national
income (if not of consumption) with price sta-
bility or even price decline.84 If this develop-
Forexample, Chandler("Potentialities and Limita-
tions," p. 4) suggests an upper limit of only 5 per cent.
"See Thomas Wilson, Inflation, Harvard University
Press, 1961, Chap. 8.
ment spreads, if its accompanying controls be-
come less stringent, and if it is reflected in un-
dercutting of"capitalist" pricesin neutral
countries, it may also be necessary to rethink
our present monetary and fiscal arrangements.
Ireferparticularlytothose arrangements
which, in the interests of employment, growth,
and peace between pressure groups, result in
definition of "reasonable price stability" to
mean a doubling of the price level approximate-
ly every generation.
Entry of the price level into competitive co-
existence seemed to be already at hand in the
latter half of 1958 and the beginning of
with Soviet and Chinese trade expansion cam-
paigns.It has been postponed subsequently,
primarily(it would appear) by Soviet and
Chinese agricultural difficulties.I should like
to claim that we have used the resulting breath-
ing spell intelligently for purposes of monetary
and fiscal reform and reconstruction, but that
does not yet seem to be the case. Rather, re-
form and reconstruction must await a crisis
situation at whatever time the price level enters
competitive coexistence more firmly and deci-
sively —assumingneither serious depression
nor galloping inflation occurs first.